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Patenting Strategies of the EU Pharmaceutical Industry – Crossroad between 
Patent Law and Competition Policy 
 
Nicoleta Tuominen(*) 
 
 
Introduction 
The pharmaceutical sector inquiry carried out by the European Commission in 2008 
provides a useful framework for assessing the relationship between the patent system on the 
one hand and competition policy and law on the other hand. The pharmaceutical market is not 
only specifically regulated. It is also influenced by the special characteristics of the patent 
system which enables pharmaceutical companies engaged in research activities to enter into 
additional arrangements to cope with the competitive pressures of early patent application 
and the delays in drug approval. Patents appear difficult to reconcile with the need for 
sufficient and adequate access to medicines, which is why competition expectations imposed 
on the pharmaceutical sector are very high. The patent system and competition law are 
interacting components of the market, into which they must both be integrated. This can result 
in competition law taking a very strict view on the pharmaceutical industry by establishing 
strict functional performance standards for the reliance on intellectual property rights 
protection granted by patent law. This is in particular because in this sector the potential 
welfare losses are not likely to be of only monetary nature. In brief, the more inefficiencies the 
patent system produces, the greater the risk of an expansive application of competition law in 
this field. 
The aim of the present study is to offer a critical and objective view on the use or 
abuse of patents and defensive strategies in the pharmaceutical industry. It shall also seek to 
establish whether patents as presently regulated offer an appropriate degree of protection of 
intellectual property held by the economic operators in the pharmaceutical sector and whether 
there is a need or, for that matter, scope for improvement. 
A useful starting point for the present study is provided by the pharmaceutical sector 
competition inquiry (hereafter “the sector inquiry”) carried out by the European Commission 
during the first half of 2008. On 8 July 2008, the Commission adopted its Final Report 
pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation 1/2003 EC, revealing a series of “antitrust shortcomings” 
that would require further investigation
1
.  
 
I. The Unique Nature of the European Pharmaceutical Industry 
The findings of the Commission sector inquiry as presented in the Final Report have 
been subject to strong criticism notably on the part of the industry but also by academics and 
other commentators. To better understand those arguments it would seem helpful to begin 
                                                          
(*)  Academic assistant at the College of Europe in Bruges, European Legal Studies Department. 
1 European Commission Press Release of 8.07.2009, IP/09/1098. Available at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/1098&format=HTML&aged=0&language=
EN&guiLanguage=en, accessed on18 March 2011. 
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with a brief overview of the basic features that influence and make the sector in the European 
Union so unique. In legal literature those feature have been identified to include: “(…) i) the 
need for a strong pharmaceutical sector in Europe; ii) the need for the industry to be able to 
fund research and development independently; iii) price controls and purchase arrangements 
maintained by the Member States; iv) failure to appreciate that the pharmaceutical industry is 
in business; v) realising the single market; and vi) the Community competition rules.”
2
  
The process behind the discovery, production and ultimately the distribution of drugs 
differentiates the pharmaceutical sectors from any other industry
3
. As concluded in the Single 
Market Law Review on the pharmaceutical sector in the European Union
4
, the pharmaceutical 
market is a highly fragmented one, where specific conditions are treated with specific 
medicine and where individual products hold very little market share on national markets; 
similar medicine is used in most Member States, especially for serious diseases to the extent 
that a potentially pan-European market in medicine has emerged; the industry engages in 
innovation, production, marketing and distribution, it comprises companies of various sizes
5
, 
of which the large ones are engaged in R&D and have extended their business operations to 
cover also markets outside the European Union. 
 
1. The Market 
The global pharmaceutical market accounted for an estimated € 484,130 million ($ 
663,500 million) at ex-factory prices in 2007, the North American market (USA & Canada) 
remaining the largest market with a 45.9% share, while Europe covered 31.1% of the market.
6
 
Distribution margins and VAT rates differ considerably between Member States (the rate of 
VAT on medicine is 3% in Luxemburg as compared with 25 % in Norway, Denmark and 
Sweden) and approximately 36% of the retail price of medicine returns to the distributors and 
the State.
7
 According the European Commission‟s Final Report of the Pharmaceutical Sector 
Inquiry, “in 2007, the market for prescription and non-prescription medicines for human use in 
the EU was worth over € 138 billion ex-factory and € 214 billion at retail prices”
8
, which makes 
it significantly more profitable than any other sector of the manufacturing industry. 
                                                          
2  Russell Graeme Hunter, The Pharmaceutical Sector in the European Union: Intellectual Property Rights, 
Parallel Trade and Community Competition Law, Juristförlaget, Stockholm, 2001, p. 5. 
3  Subseries I: Impact on Manufacturing, Vol. 2: Pharmaceutical Products, „The Pharmaceutical Sector in the 
EU‟, (1997), The Single Market Review, p. 99. 
4  Ibid. 
5  Ibid, p. 103. 
6  European  Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations, (EFPIA hereafter), The 
Pharmaceutical Industry in Figures, Edition 2009, p. 14, EFPIA Publication. Available at: 
http://www.efpia.eu/content/default.asp?PageID=559&DocID=4883, accessed on18 April 2010. 
7  Ibid. 
8  Commission Communication, of 8 July 2008, Executive Summary of the Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry 
Report, p. 1. Available at: 
  http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/communication_en.pdf, accessed on 23 
April 2010. 
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Manufacturers of “generics”
9
 can play an important role on the European 
pharmaceuticals markets albeit geographically their market shares vary considerably from 
one country to another. The market share of generics is for instance as high as 74% in 
Croatia and as little as 7.2 % in Spain and in general it would seem that their market shares 
tend to be higher in new EU Member States, which is mostly due to the formerly low levels of 
intellectual property protection in those Member States
10
. Delays in generic entry have a 
significant economic impact as prices for generics are on average 25% lower than prices of 
originator medicines before patent expiry
11
.  
 
2. Major Issue: Research and Development 
Before being fit for marketing, medicine requires intense investments on the part of 
the pharmaceutical companies. “The latest study released (…) estimated the average cost of 
researching and developing a new chemical or biological entity at €1,059 million.”
12
 
Almost all R&D costs are financed from the industry‟s own resources. As the 
Commission observed
13
, 90% of R&D is industry-financed and, that is an ability that should be 
preserved due to the risks inherent in such high investments. Moreover, the R&D costs 
constitute a high entry barrier. Companies are indeed difficult to replace if they disappeared 
from the market
14
 and fewer pharmaceutical companies translates in fewer new products 
being developed in the future. 
Chances of isolating a substance with therapeutic value are relatively small, with 
several estimates ranging from 1 in 5,000 to 1 in 10,000
15
. As Valentine Korah expressed it: 
“(...) most attempts to find a cure for particular problems by the pharmaceutical companies do 
not work. Of those that do, many never get far through their safety trials. So a small loss is 
made on most drugs. A few almost get to the market, but then some side effect appears and 
those cost the inventor a great deal. Only a few drugs are successful and the company must 
make a large profit on these to make up for the losses on the other, or R&D will not be 
worthwhile”.
16
  
Thus not every attempt to develop a new medicine turns out to be a commercial 
success such as Prozac. Sometimes there are tragedies like Thalidomide
17
 and numerous 
                                                          
9  “Generics are usually produced by a manufacturer who is not the inventor of the original product, and are 
marketed when intellectual property protection rights are exhausted. “The Pharmaceutical Industry in 
Figures...” supra note 6, p. 17. 
10  Ibid. 
11  Commission Communication, supra note 8, p. 9. 
12  EFPIA, A highly regulated industry, Available at: 
  http://www.efpia.org/content/Default.asp?PageID=361, accessed on 18 March 2011. 
13  Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the Outlines of an 
Industrial Policy for the Pharmaceutical Sector in the European Community, COM (93) 718 final (Brussels, 
02.03.1994), p. 5. 
14  Alfonso Gamardella, Luigi Orsenigo, Fabio Pammolli, Global Competitiveness in Pharmaceuticals: A 
European Perspective, November, 2000, p. 16. Available at: www.pharmacos.eudra.org, 18 March 2011. 
15  EFPIA, supra note 13. 
16  Valentine Korah, “Merck v. Primecrown – The Exhaustion of Patents by Sale in a Member State where a 
Monopoly Profit Could not be Earned”, (1997) 4 ECLR 273.  
17  Wikipedia, Thalidomide, Available at: http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thalidomide, accessed on 18 March 2011. 
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drugs turn out to be of no therapeutic value after having exhausted important R&D 
resources.
18
 
The process of bringing a new medicine on the market is estimated to take on an 
average 10-13 years. While 5000 molecules are initially tested, 250 will enter into preclinical 
testing, 10 into clinical development and only 1 will be approved by the regulatory authorities 
and released on the market, where only 3 out of 10 medicines produce revenues matching or 
exceeding R&D costs before patent expiry
19
 and intense generic competition.  
However the business activities of pharmaceutical companies remain extremely 
profitable
20
 and it would seem that in the pursuit of those profits they are not exhausting all 
their resources in R&D. It is indeed interesting to note that at least in the case of some 
products R&D expenses incurred by the industry are exceeded by their marketing costs.
21
 
 
3.  Price Controls and Purchase Arrangements 
The pharmaceutical sector is one where clients can impose their will, given that the 
most significant customers consist in the national healthcare systems of the Member States. 
Price controls limiting the emerging of a fully competitive market in pharmaceuticals are 
therefore a common feature and a frequently used instrument in this field.
22
 
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union provides that: “A high level of 
human health protection shall be ensured in the definition and implementation of all Union 
policies and activities.”
23
 
A provision like that begs the question as to whether such an objective can coexist 
with the governments endeavour to reduce public spending as their recourses are often on 
short supply. From this perspective, price controls and purchase arrangements do seem as 
very tempting tools and not entirely objectionable.  
Obviously, market-based pricing for reimbursed pharmaceuticals would be the 
industry‟s favourite solution. Nevertheless, close collaboration between governments and the 
industry might deliver the much expected change towards enhanced competitiveness, which 
would lead to more efficiency in the healthcare systems.
24
  
Pharmaceutical companies require that the price society is prepared to pay for an 
innovative medicine “should reflect the value it delivers to patients, healthcare systems, and 
society at large”.
25
 However, this argument is untenable, since the value of a patent consists 
                                                          
18  Stephen Kon, Fiona Schaeffer, “Parallel Imports of Pharmaceutical Products: A New Realism, or Back to 
Basics”, (1997) 3 ECLR 124. 
19 EFPIA, supra note 13. 
20 Carinne Bruneton, [e-med] Industrie Pharmaceutique: Protéger ses profits. Available at : 
http://www.essentialdrugs.org/emed/archive/200410/msg00053.php, accessed on 18 March 2011. 
21  Barry Bleidt, “Recent Issues and Concerns about Pharmaceutical Industry Promotional Efforts”, (1992) 
Vol. 22, No. 2, Journal of Drug Issues, pp. 413-414. 
22 Hunter, supra note 2, p. 10. 
23  Article 168 (1) TFEU (ex 152 EC). 
24 EFPIA, Policy Principles for a Competitive Healthcare Environment, p. 1. Available at: 
http://www.efpia.eu/Content/Default.asp?PageID=559&DocID=3826,  accessed on 18 March 2011. 
25  Ibid, p. 4. 
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of that what the market is willing to pay for it
26
. Nevertheless, if governments negotiated only 
for the prices of medicine they will purchase or reimburse, allowing for sales outside the state 
reimbursement system to be subjected to the normal market rules, this could solve to some 
extent the problems of market distortion.
27
  
Another conflict is the one between the Commission‟s objectives of finalising the 
Single Market for pharmaceuticals and the exclusive right of Member States to determine 
their own healthcare policies
28
. The conflict could be solved if Member States would agree on 
a complete harmonisation of prices at the EU level, although this might jeopardise the 
increase in social welfare through price discrimination
29
. Pharmaceutical price policies should 
also be assessed with due consideration to the effectiveness of the patent system in 
general
30
. The value of a patent should be determined by what the market would be willing to 
pay for the medicines, which is why pricing policies inevitably diminish the value of patents. 
 
4.  Conflicting Interests in the Pharmaceutical Sector 
Another defining feature of the pharmaceutical sector is that there are conflicting 
interests between the industry and those empowered to regulate the market. Whereas 
originator companies strive for longer patent exclusivity the European Commission and 
National Competition authorities tend to prioritise compliance with Community and national 
competition rules over IPR. 
Intellectual property rights undoubtedly play an important role in fostering medical and 
scientific progress. According to the originator companies
31
, IPR only enable them to recoup 
their R&D investment and compensate for the risks they have assumed
32
. In this regard, the 
industry argues that “the patent system balances the interests of the inventor with the broader 
interests of society at large,”
33
 since they are a means for the inventor to eliminate “free 
riders” and for the society to increase its knowledge base
34
. 
In addition, because of long clinical testing, registration process and market access 
delays, instead of the full lifetime of a patent which on average is 20 years, medicines only 
enjoy roughly from 8 to 10 years effective protection,
35
 since normally patent applications are 
                                                          
26  Hans Ullrich, “Lizenzkartellrecht auf dem Weg zur Mitte”, (1996), GRUR Int., p. 564. 
27  EFPIA, Policy Principles, supra note 25, p. 5. 
28 Klaus Stegemann, “International Price Discrimination and Market Segmentation for Patented 
Pharmaceuticals in the EU. A Social Welfare Analysis”, in Inge Govaere, Hanns Ullrich (eds.), Intellectual 
Property, Public Policy and International Trade, “College of Europe Series” No 6, Brussels, P.I.E. Peter 
Lang, 2007, p. 167. 
29  Ibid. 
30  Carsten Fink, “International Price Discrimination and Market Segmentation for Patented Pharmaceuticals 
in the EU. A Social Welfare Analysis – A Comment”, in Inge Govaere, Hanns Ullrich (eds.), Intellectual 
Property, Public Policy and International Trade, “College of Europe Series” No 6, Brussels, P.I.E. Peter 
Lang, 2007, p. 171. 
31 EFPIA, Competition occurs through successful R&D. Available at: 
http://www.efpia.org/Content/Default.asp?PageID=538, accessed on 18 March 2011. 
32 EFPIA, FACTSHEET: Understanding patents and their vital role in medicine discovery, p. 1. Available at: 
http://www.efpia.eu/Content/Default.asp?PageID=559&DocID=5348, accessed on 18 March 2011. 
33  Ibid. 
34  Ibid. 
35  EFPIA, supra note 32. 
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filled early in the research phase. Although most profits from a branded pharmaceutical are 
derived during the first five- to eight-years of market exclusivity
36
 the relatively short period of 
legal protection may diminish originator companies‟ possibilities of receiving an adequate 
return on their investments. The EU has to some extent acknowledged this problem and 
introduced a Supplementary Protection Certificate, ensuring a maximum of 15 years market 
exclusivity for new products
37
. 
Another reason why originators require longer exclusivity is the threat of generics. 
Whatever the exact cost of an originator product market entry might be, “the cost to a generic 
of obtaining approval is orders of magnitude below that needed to bring an innovative product 
to market. Further, as a general rule, it is technically easy for a generic company to copy an 
innovative small molecule product”.
 38
 
More compelling than the high difference in market entry costs between originator 
products and generics, is the fact that while innovator companies incur high R&D risks, the 
generic manufactures assume little or no risk at all. The regulatory approval is not difficult to 
obtain since the product will be entering an already existing market
39
. 
It is therefore evident that IP exclusivity is necessary in order for companies to be 
interested in pursuing innovation. 
Even the EC legislator has stated: “without effective means of enforcing intellectual 
property rights, innovation and creativity are discouraged and investment diminished.”
40
 
The Directorate General for Enterprise and Industry of the European Commission 
considers that the European pharmaceutical sector is at a competitive disadvantage 
compared to the American pharmaceuticals producers and suggests that measures should be 
taken to strengthen the position of European producers
41
. The relevant question in this 
context is “what type of competition”
42
 would be to the benefit of consumers. Given the unique 
nature of the pharmaceutical industry it may be argued that the Commission should apply 
competition rules in a manner that differs from the way they are applied to undertakings in 
other sectors. This view appears to be accepted by the Commission, which in its Lederle-
                                                          
36  Robin Daly, Mick Kolassa, Start Early, Sell More, Sell Longer, (2004), Pharma Exec., pp. 8-20, as cited by 
Robin Mitchell, Debra Bingham, in Rules to Live or Die By For Life Cycle Management. Available at: 
http://www.pharmaquality.com/ME2/Audiences/dirmod.asp?sid=325598564E8C4B3EB736C7159241312D
&nm=Browse+Articles&type=Publishing&mod=Publications%3A%3AArticle&mid=D3E3C719D8D4421683
6DCA4F4144BEC4&AudID=5648A5C28C97462DBBDB309539B820EF&tier=4&id=2482698BE7B7474F8
A875B62C100DD58, 18 March 2011. 
37  EFPIA FACTSHEET, supra note 31. 
38 EFPIA, Intellectual Property and Pharmaceuticals, p. 15. Available at: 
http://www.efpia.eu/Content/Default.asp?PageID=559&DocID=4901, accessed on 18 March 2011. 
39  Ibid. 
40  Council Directive 2004/48/EC, of 29 April, 2004, on the enforcement of intellectual property rights, Recital 
3, OJ L 195/16–25. 
41  Hunter, supra note 2, p. 13. 
42  Ibid, p. 14. 
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Praxis Biologicals decision
43
 refused to apply the general rule on compulsory licensing as 
established in Magill
44
 to the pharmaceutical sector exactly because of its special nature. 
In Lederle-Praxis Biologicals, the Commission held that: “(...) at the current stage of 
Competition law, it is highly doubtful whether one could impose an obligation upon a dominant 
form remedy to ensure the maintenance of effective competition in the national ... markets, to 
share its intellectual property rights with third parties to allow them to develop, produce and 
market the same products...which the alleged dominant firm is also seeking to develop, 
produce and market. This was judged to be all the more precarious in sectors such as the 
vaccine sector where R&D requires high investment. Even a simple refusal to supply could 
not be considered as an abuse as Lederle was not an existing customer that had found itself 
in a situation of factual dependence.”
45
 
However, the Commission is not always consistent in this view, as evidenced by the 
Bayer-Adalat decision
46
, where the Commission appeared to be encouraging parallel trade to 
the detriment of originators. Such lack of consistency together with other market distorting 
factors does seem to offer a potential justification for the industry to engage in defensive 
strategies
47
.  
A constructive approach to remedying the competitiveness deficit within the 
pharmaceutical sector could be found trough ensuring an adequate level of IP protection 
rather than by promoting parallel trade over originator producers.
48
 As Russell G. Hunter 
concluded: “This [the pharmaceutical industry] is an environment typified by imperfect 
competition, where the legislative and judicial organs of the Community must maintain a 
balance between realising the Single Market while respecting the function and integrity of IP 
rights, as well as ensuring the social element of the pharmaceutical industry is not sacrificed 
on the altar of the Single Market. Unlike other sectors, the barriers to entry are such as to 
naturally exclude new entrants – for the pharmaceutical industry requires huge sums to be 
invested with no guarantee of any return and high risk of failure. There is no scope for 
pursuing the wrong economic policy in a market in which the chances of success are between 
0.02 and 0.03% of a successful new discovery.”
49
 
 
II. Legal Tools for Protecting IP for Pharmaceuticals 
In the pharmaceutical sector in the European Union, the industry has the following 
legal instruments at its disposal for intellectual property rights protection: patents, 
supplementary protection certificates, regulatory data protection and a 10-year market 
                                                          
43  Commission Decision 94/770/EC, of  6 October 1994, relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 85 of the 
EC Treaty (now Article 101 TFEU) and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (IV/34.776 – Pasteur Merieux – 
Merck), 1994, OJ L309/94, pp. 1-23. 
44  Joined Cases C-241 & C-242/91 P, RTE and ITP v Commission, [1995] ECR I-00743. 
45  Cited in See Hunter, supra note 2, p. 15. 
46 Commission Decision 96/478/EC, of 10 January 1996, relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EC 
Treaty (now 101 TFEU), OJ L201/96, pp. 1-77. 
47  Hunter, supra note 2, p. 15. 
48 Ibid. 
49  Ibid, p. 16. 
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exclusivity for orphan drugs (drugs used for the treatment of rare conditions)
50
. As regards the 
latter, the European legislator has explicitly recognised the need to encourage the research 
also in drugs of little demand, stating that in the case of extremely rare conditions, which 
would not allow for the R&D costs to be recouped by the expected sales, a special level of 
protection would be justified.”
51
 
 
1. Patents  
Despite the fact that the patent system is not completely harmonised within the EU, it 
is a fair assumption that the patent systems of the Member States are roughly similar
52
. This 
is because of the harmonising effect of the TRIPS Agreement, Member States are parties to 
the European Patent Convention 2000
53
 and the fact that Member States have adopted some 
key provisions of the Community Patent Convention.  
The EPO grants patents only if the invention is patentable
54
, i.e. the invention is 
novel
55
, inventive
56
 and susceptible of industrial application
57
. Patent claims can be filled 
either with the national patent offices or with EPO, in which case, the patent will “confer on its 
proprietor from the date of publication of the mention of its grant, in each Contracting State in 
respect of which it is granted, the same rights as would be conferred by a national patent 
granted in that State”.
58
 The period of protection is 20 years from the date of the filling
59
. 
According to Art. 28 of the TRIPs Agreement
60
, patents create a general negative 
obligation by which third parties are forbidden to manufacture, market or import for such 
purposes the product, and if the patent concerns a process, third parties are precluded from 
using or marketing that process. Patents also create rights for their holders. They can assign, 
                                                          
50 Council Regulation 141/2000, of 16 December 1999, on Orphan Medicinal Products, [22. 1. 2000], OJ L 
18/1. 
51 Ibid, paras. 1-2. 
52 EFPIA, Intellectual Property and Pharmaceuticals, p. 16. Available at: 
http://www.efpia.eu/Content/Default.asp?PageID=559&DocID=4901, accessed on 19 April 2010. 
53  Convention on the Grant of European Patents (European Patent Convention), of 5 October 1973, as 
amended by the act revising Article 63 EPC of 17 December 1991 and by decisions of the Administrative 
Council of the European Patent Organisation of 21 December 1978, 13 December 1994, 20 October 1995, 
5 December 1996, 10 December 1998 and 27 October 2005 and comprising the provisionally applicable 
provisions of the act revising the EPC of 29 November 2000. 
54  Art. 52 (EPC) – Patentable inventions: “1) European patents shall be granted for any inventions which are 
susceptible of industrial application, which are new and which involve an inventive step.” 
55  Article 54 (EPC) – Novelty: “(1) An invention shall be considered to be new if it does not form part of the 
state of the art. (2) The state of the art shall be held to comprise everything made available to the public by 
means of a written or oral description, by use, or in any other way, before the date of filing of the European 
patent application.” 
56  Article 56 (EPC) - Inventive step: “An invention shall be considered as involving an inventive step if, having 
regard to the state of the art, it is not obvious to a person skilled in the art.” 
57  Article 57(EPC) - Industrial application: “An invention shall be considered as susceptible of industrial 
application if it can be made or used in any kind of industry, including agriculture.” 
58  See Art. 64 of the EPC. 
59  See Art. 63 of the EPC. 
60  Article 28 of TRIPS: “1. A patent shall confer on its owner the following exclusive rights:  (a) where the 
subject matter of a patent is a product, to prevent third parties not having the owner‟s consent from the 
acts of: making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes that product; (b) where the 
subject matter of a patent is a process, to prevent third parties not having the owner‟s consent from the act 
of using the process, and from the acts of: using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes 
at least the product obtained directly by that process.  2. Patent owners shall also have the right to assign, 
or transfer by succession, the patent and to conclude licensing contracts.” 
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transfer by succession or conclude licensing agreements. However, such right can be 
enforced only by the holder of the patent (or by an exclusive licensee) in legal infringement 
proceeding and to the extent that the patent is valid
61
. 
In the pharmaceutical sector, patent applications are filed very early in the R&D 
process, which diminishes considerably the 20-year protection period. 
Most patent filling by European pharmaceutical companies are made in accordance 
with the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), because it gives the possibility of designating 
almost 140 countries. Some are filed with the EPO and others with the Member States‟ patent 
offices
62
. 
When filing with the EPO, the patent application undergoes a thorough examination, 
which is why patents approved by EPO are considered to be of a very high quality.
63
 
Applicants can put forward arguments in support of the patentability of their inventions, which 
can consist of technical data and expert reports.
64
 Third parties can, also anonymously, file 
observations against patent application
65
, to which the applicant has the opportunity to 
respond.
66
 If an application is rejected, the applicant can lodge an appeal, which is then 
decided by the Appeal Board
67
. 
 
2.  Supplementary Protection Certificates  
In response to the perceived insufficiency of the period of protection offered by 
patents, the Council of Ministers made an effort to bring about a remedy by adopting its 
Regulation 1768/92
68
 which introduced the Supplementary Protection Certificate. The recitals 
2 and 3 of the Regulation state that: “[M]edicinal products, especially those that are the result 
of long, costly research will not continue to be developed in the Community and in Europe 
unless they are covered by favourable rules that provide for sufficient protection to encourage 
such research … [A]t the moment the period that elapses between the filing of an application 
for a patent for a new medicinal product and authorization to place the medicinal product on 
the market makes the period of effective protection under the patent insufficient to cover the 
investment put into the research.” 
In terms of its effects the certificate functions much like a regular patent
69
 as it 
extends the initial patent protection by up to 5 years
70
. However, the patent holder cannot 
enjoy more than 15 years of combined patent and SPS exclusivity from the first authorisation 
                                                          
61  EFPIA,, supra note 53, p. 17. 
62  Ibid. 
63  Ibid, p. 18.  
64  Ibid. 
65  In 2006, 5.4% of applications have been opposed to. See European Patent Office Annual Report 2006. 
Available at http://www.epo.org/about-us/office/annual-reports.html, accessed on 18 March 2011. 
66  EFPIA, supra note 53, p. 19. 
67  Ibid. 
68  Council Regulation 1768/92, of 18 June 1992, concerning the creation of a supplementary protection 
certificate for medicinal products, [2.7.1992] OJ L 182. 
69  See Art. 5 of the Council Regulation 1768/92. 
70  See Art. 13 of the Council Regulation 1768/92. 
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in the Community
 71
. The certificate can be given in respect of products already enjoying the 
protection of a valid patent
72
 and if different parties hold patents relating to the same product, 
each of them is entitled to a separate SPC
73
.  
In Novartis AG and others v. Comptroller-General of Patents Designs and Trade 
Marks for the United Kingdom, and Ministre de l'Économie v Millennium Pharmaceuticals 
Inc.,
74
 the ECJ held that the SPC for medical products “is to take effect at the end of the lawful 
term of the basic patent for a period equal to the period which elapsed between the date on 
which the application for a basic patent was lodged and the date of the first authorisation to 
place the product on the market in the territory of one of the States covered by the EEA 
Agreement, reduced by a period of five years.”
75
 
Additional IP protection for exclusive rights against imitation is granted trough 
Regulation EC 1901/2006
76
. This Regulation requires for the release of a marketing 
authorisation relating to the use of a product on children (unless a waiver or deferral is 
granted), that a paediatric investigation plan is established and data is submitted to the 
European Medicines Agency
77
. As compensation for conducting the paediatric research, the 
patent holder which qualifies for an SPC or the holder of an SPS is entitled to a 6-month 
extension of the protection period
78
.  
 
3.  Regulatory Data Protection 
“Regulatory data protection (“RDP”) is a form of exclusive right enforced through the 
marketing authorisation procedure.”
79
 An originator company when releasing a new medicine 
on the market must provide vast amount of information on its product
80
 in order to obtain the 
necessary market authorisation
81
. However, in order for a subsequent generic manufacturer 
to bring the same product on the market it must either generate its own data or wait a certain 
                                                          
71  See Recital 8 of the Council Regulation 1768/92. 
72  See Art. 4 of the Council Regulation 1768/92. 
73  See Article 3(2) of Regulation 1610/96, of 23 July 1996, concerning the creation of a supplementary 
protection certificate for plant protection products, [8.8.1996], OJ L 198, According to the Recitals of 
Regulation 1610/96, the provisions of Article 3(2) are for the interpretation of Article 3 of Regulation 
1768/92. 
74  Cases C-207/03 Novartis v. Comptroller General and C-252/03 Ministre de l'Economie v Millenium 
Pharmaceuticals, [2005] RPC 33.  
75  Ibid,, para. 26. 
76  Council Regulation 1901/2006, of 12 December 2006, on medicinal products for paediatric use, amending 
Regulation (EEC) 1768/92, Directive 2001/20/EC, Directive 2001/83/EC and Regulation (EC) 726/2004, 
[27.12.2006] OJ L 378. 
77 See Art. 15 of Regulation 1901/2006. 
78 EFPIA, supra note 53, p. 20. 
79  Ibid. 
80  Ibid. 
81  See Art. 6(1) of  Council Directive 2001/83/EC, of 6 November 2001,  on the Community Code Relating to 
Medicinal Products for Human Use, (28/11/2004) OJ L–311, as amended by Directive 2002/98/EC, of the 
European Parliament and of the Council, of 27 January 2003, setting standards of quality and safety for 
the collection, testing, processing, storage and distribution of human blood and blood components, 
(08/02/2003), OJ L–33, by Directive 2004/24/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 31 March 
2004 amending, as regards traditional herbal medicinal products, Directive 2001/83/EC on the Community 
code relating to medicinal products for human use, (30/04/2004) OJ L–136, and by Directive 2004/27/EC 
of the European Parliament and the Council of 31 March 2004, (30/04/2004) OJ L–136. 
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period until it would be permitted to rely on the data provided by the innovator
82
. Such an 
approach seems to be in compliance with Article 39(3) of TRIPs which states: “Members, 
when requiring, as a condition of approving the marketing of pharmaceutical or of agricultural 
chemical products which utilise new chemical entities, the submission of undisclosed test or 
other data, the origination of which involves a considerable effort, shall protect such data 
against unfair commercial use. In addition, Members shall protect such data against 
disclosure, except where necessary to protect the public, or unless steps are taken to ensure 
that the data are protected against unfair commercial use. “ 
The generic manufacturer‟s application for authorisation can be described as 
“abridged” and can only be used after defined periods of time
83
: firstly, no valid application 
using the abridged procedure can be made in the first 8 years from the date of first 
authorisation in the Community, after the initial 8 years, requests for generic authorisation can 
be made, but actual marketing cannot take place before 10 years from the first Community 
authorisation have elapsed. An additional delay of generic entry exists if the originator obtains 
approval of new therapeutic indications. 
However, in practice the exclusivity rendered by the RDP is weak because of several 
reasons
84
. For instance, the RDP period overlaps with any patents or SPCs and is very likely 
to expire before them. In addition, once the RDP period expires, manufacturers of generics 
can seek approval to launch their products, independently of existing patent, in which case 
the patent holder is entitled to initiate infringement proceedings, but only after the generic 
product has been placed on the market. In conclusion, RDP would only be relevant if there 
was no other IP protection. 
 
III. Strategic Patenting of Pharmaceuticals in the European Union 
 
1. Introduction to „Evergreening‟ 
In the final report of the European Commission‟s sector inquiry
85
, the Commission 
identifies a series of originator patent strategies, which it describes as aiming “to extend the 
breadth and duration of their patent protection”
86
 and “to delay or block the market entry of 
generic medicines”
87
. Such strategies are: patent thickets/ clusters, secondary or follow-on-
patents and defensive patenting. At the same time, the Commission recognises that “patents 
are key in the pharmaceutical sector, as they allow companies to recoup their often very 
considerable investments and to be rewarded for their innovative efforts”
88
, which is why 
                                                          
82  See Art. 10 of Directive 2001/83/EC. 
83  Ibid. 
84  EFPIA, supra note 53, p. 21. 
85  European Commission, Communication from the Commission - Executive Summary of the Pharmaceutical 
Sector Inquiry Report.  Available at:  
 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/index.html, accessed on 18 March 2011. 
86  Commission Communication, supra note 87, p. 11. 
87  Ibid. 
88  European Commission, Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Preliminary Report (DG Competition Staff Working 
Paper), of 28 November 2008, p. 5. Available at: 
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competition rules should not be applied in the same manner as they would in other 
technology areas
89
. 
As discussed in Section III, a patent is an exclusive right given to the inventor or his 
licensee, for a period of 20 years, in exchange of having disclosed the invention. It is the 
reward for enlarging the knowledge base of mankind. However, some innovator companies 
seek to extend this period of patent protection. For this purpose, they make use of a practice 
called „evergreening‟, which is defined as follows: “‟Evergreening‟ refers to different ways 
wherein patent owners take undue advantage of the law and associated regulatory process to 
extend their IP monopoly particularly over highly lucrative „blockbuster drugs‟ by filing 
disguised/ artful patents on an already patent-protected invention shortly after expiry of the 
„parent‟ patent. These artful patents tend to protect delivery profiles, packaging, derivatives, 
and isomeric forms, mechanism of action, dosing regimen, and dosing rage, and dosing 
route, different methods of treatment, combinations, screening methods, biological targets 
and field of use for the same old molecule.”
90
 
 „Evergreening‟ raises numerous fundamental questions. It allows innovator 
companies to recover high R&D costs and provides an instrument for innovators to obtain 
legal protection for any improvements that they may have made to their inventions
91
. At the 
same time, multiple patents on the same product can prolong the exclusivity that the patentee 
enjoys
92
 and, organising entire patent portfolios on the basis of what is commonly termed as 
“lucrative molecules” can result in potential loss to competitors, as their market entry would be 
delayed or completely blocked
93
. Although „evergreening‟ can occur in any industry, it is said 
to be more frequent in the pharmaceutical sector where “patents cover such aspects of drugs 
as their active ingredient, formulations, methods of medical treatment, method of 
manufacturing, and chemical intermediates”
94
.  
 
2.  Innovator Product vs. Generic - Extended Patents  
In relation to generic manufacturers, originators use patenting practices, aiming at 
replacing the original preparation by similar follow-on-products through simple proprietary 
modifications and / or name changes, and subsequently placing them on the market just 
before the expiry of the exclusivity so that they can assume the economic role of the original 
                                                                                                                                                                      
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/preliminary_report.pdf, accessed on 18 
March 2011. 
89  Stephen Mavroghenis, Article 82 EC and Strategic Patenting – Patent Thickets, Defensive Patents, and 
Follow-on Patents, p. 4. Available at: 
http://www.droit.ulg.ac.be/ieje/fileadmin/IEJE/Pdf/Mavroghenis_Strategic_Patenting_and_Article_82_EC.p
df, accessed on 18 March 2011. 
90 Inderjit Singh Bansal, Deeptymaya Sahu, Gautam Bakshi, Sukhjeet Singh, “Evergreening – A 
Controversial Issue in the Pharma Milieu”, (2009) Vol. 14 Journal of International Property Rights, p. 299. 
91 GlaxoSmithKline Briefings, Evergreening. Available at: http://www.gsk.com/policies/GSK-and-
evergreening.pdf, accessed on 18 March 2011. 
92  See Sarah Beth Myers, “A Healthy Solution for Patients and Patents: How India‟s Legal Victory Against A 
Pharmaceutical Giant Reconciles Human Rights with Intellectual Property Rights,” (2008), 10 Vanderbilt 
Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law. 763. 
93  Bansal, supra note 90, p. 2. 
94  John R. Thomas, Patent “Evergreening”: Issues in Innovation and Competition, p. 4. Available at: 
http://ipmall.info/hosted_resources/crs/R40917_091113.pdf, accessed on 18 March 2011. 
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specimen
95
. The manufacturer of the original product seems less interested in obtaining the 
broadest possible patent basis for his first generation drug, than in the further course of 
product‟s life cycle, i.e. he tries to develop innovative patentable variations which will enable 
him to extend the first product life cycles
96
.  
After patent expiry, generic manufacturers can file an application for an equivalent 
innovator drug. However, this also means that “a prodigious amount of investment is at risk 
for innovator companies”
97
. To protect their interests, as previously stated, originator 
companies engage in „evergreening‟ strategies. While such defensive strategies are 
frequently used in the pharmaceutical sector, comparable practices of patent applications are 
not unprecedented in other industries either.  
 
2.1.  Patent “thickets” or “clusters” 
Patent „thickets‟ or patent „clusters‟ are formed when “originators file numerous broad 
and „weak‟ patents around the original molecule patent.”
98
 Divisional patent applications split 
parent patent application into one or several narrower patent applications
99
. 
Clusters and thickets have the effect of increasing the uncertainty of the generic 
manufacturer regarding the originator‟s IP rights when it attempts to enter the market
100
, 
because it cannot properly asses the scope of the innovator‟s IP portfolio. Generics are left 
with two options: either to wait until all the patents forming the patent family have expired, or 
to apply for a marketing authorisation and run the risk of litigation
101
. Hence, such practices 
can have the effect of limiting competition, which raises the question as to whether they might 
contravene the relevant provisions of TFEU? The answer to such a question will obviously 
depend on the particular facts and circumstances present in each case. However, there are 
some general arguments and considerations to be borne in mind in this context.  
It has been suggested that when clusters serve the sole purpose of eliminating 
potential competition, “this is not in line with the underlying objectives of the patent system 
and is anti-competitive”
102
. The European Commission in its turn seems to take the view that 
legitimate business practices cannot become illegitimate simply by their cumulative 
application
103
, but that there clearly is a problem if permissible patenting and enforcement 
practices can be used in cases where there is little or no legal justification for them
104
.  
                                                          
95 Hanns Ullrich, “Wahrung von Wettbewerbsfreiräumen innerhalb der Schutzrechtsverwertung“, Die 
Sektoruntersuchung Pharma - kartellrechtliche Disziplinierung des Patentsystems? Symposium 17 Juli 
2009 München - Vorträge und Materialien, Bücher Carl Heymanns Verlag. 
96  Ibid. 
97  Bansal, supra note 90, p. 4. 
98  Mavroghenis, supra note 91, p. 5. 
99  Idem, p. 6. 
100  Mavroghenis, supra note 91, p. 7. 
101  European Generic Association, Evergreening of Pharmaceutical Market Protection. Available at: 
 http://www.egagenerics.com/gen-evergrn.htm, accessed on 18 March 2011. 
102  Mavroghenis, supra note 91, p. 10. 
103  European Commission, Final Report, supra note 89, p. 16. 
104  Ibid p. 15. 
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Nevertheless, it has also concluded that “[s]trong patent protection promotes ex ante 
incentives to innovate. If the invention is new, involves an inventive step and is susceptible to 
industrial application it is patentable, [and] [c]ompetition law should not second guess.”
105
 
 
2.2.  Secondary Patent Applications 
Another defensive strategy used by innovator companies is to file applications for 
secondary or follow-on-patents. Secondary or follow-on-patents, also called reformulations 
remain “the most popular and, arguably, the most effective way to prolong a product‟s 
commercial life”
106
, since it can delay competition between products based on same original 
invention
107
. However, “patenting throughout life of a product is not novel and not restricted to 
the pharmaceutical sector”
108
. Moreover, if it can be confirmed that: “A follow-on inventor that 
has made a valuable further development is not usually seen as an infringer, because courts 
tend to narrow the technical scope of the patent or, at least they refrain from expanding it 
through the doctrine of equivalence. Extra incentives are made available for the radical 
improver, so as to prevent him being held up by an earlier patent,” 
109
 which raises the 
question why an innovator applying for a secondary patent should be treated less favourably. 
Yet, one of the main issues emphasised by the Commission in its Preliminary Report 
concerns the quality of such late secondary patents. In that regard, the Commission's 
success statistics of the patent opposition and appeals between originator and generic 
manufacturers
110
 raise doubts whether the expected quality and legal safeguards of the 
patenting process are always fully observed.  
 
2.3.  Reverse Payments 
In order to prevent or delay market access, innovators occasionally conclude 
agreements with generic manufacturers, whereby, in exchange for delaying market entry, the 
generic companies accept compensation payments or other benefits from innovator 
companies
111
 or enter into settlement agreements
112
. However, the settlement of patent 
infringement disputes is only to be considered under the ambit of cartel law in so far as the 
validity or the substantive scope of a property right is seriously in doubt
113
.  
                                                          
105  Ibid, p. 11. 
106 Robin Mitchell, Debra Bingham, Rules to Live or Die By For Life Cycle Management. Available at: 
http://www.pharmaquality.com/ME2/Audiences/dirmod.asp?sid=325598564E8C4B3EB736C7159241312D
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107  European Commission, Final Report, supra note 89. 
108  Mavroghenis, supra note 91, p. 7 
109 Bengt Domeij, Patent Claim Scope: Initial and Follow-on Pharmaceutical Inventions in Europe, p. 8. 
Available at: https://www.kth.se/polopoly_fs/1.10601!initialfollow.pdf, accessed on 18 March 2011. 
110 Commission, Final Report, supra note 89, p. 13. 
111 Scott C. Hemphill, Drug Patent Settlements between Rivals: A Survey, 2007, pp. 1-49. Available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=969492, accessed on 18 March 2011. 
112  Commission, Final Report, supra note 89, p. 12. 
113  Hanns Ullrich, “VI Abschnitt. Kartellverfahrensverordnung” in Ulrich Immenga, Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker, 
Wettbewerbsrecht Kommentar zum Europäischen Kartellrecht, 4. Auflage, München, Verlag C. H. Beck, 
2007. 
 16 
 Such “reverse payments” are defined as “a variety of diverse agreements between 
patent owners and alleged infringers that involve a transfer of consideration from the patent 
owner to the alleged infringer”
114
. The mere presence or amount of reverse payments is not 
sufficient to conclude that patent settlements were illegal, nor do any estimates of an eventual 
outcome of a patent infringement dispute warrant such conclusion
115
. However, when 
competing manufacturers agree on restrictions that go beyond the exclusivity rendered 
normally by a patent, such a decision not to compete constitutes a hardcore restriction under 
Art. 4 (1) of the Technology Transfer Guidelines
116
.  
Combe
117 
describes yet another strategy of pharmaceutical companies, called 
"pseudo-generics" strategy. The primary patentee indirectly enters the generics market by 
launching himself a generic drug, but entrusts the distribution to another firm through a 
licensing agreement, without the prescriber or consumer being informed of the ties between 
the two companies
118
. At first glance, the pseudo-generics appear to have a pro-competitive 
effect, as new products are launched on the market. However, in comparative terms, the 
presence of pseudo-generics, sold at “too” low prices, may also limit the entry of "real" 
generics. 
 
3.  Competition between Originator Manufacturers 
The pharmaceutical sector inquiry report identified a series of defensive practices 
between the research-based pharmaceutical companies as further possible causes for a 
falling rate of innovation
119
. In this regard, the report acknowledges that the originator 
manufacturers do need a wide exclusivity status for their R&D activities, but such an extent 
for IPR protection can lead to patent overlaps and conflicts
120
. In this respect it may be noted 
that where the between-patent competition is particularly fierce the duration of the patent 
protection may not have as significant an impact on the incentive to engage in R&D as it has 
in the case of within-patent competition
121
. 
                                                          
114 Christopher M. Holman, “Do Reverse Payment Settlements Violate the Antitrust Laws?”, (2007), Vol. 23, 
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NOTICE-Guidelines on the Application of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to Technology Transfer Agreements, 
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industrielle, p. 46 
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Defensive patenting takes place in order to block market access of competing 
products. It supposes that an innovator company files applications for or maintains patents in 
respect of innovations without any intention of developing them further or making use of 
them
122
 other than for  the sole purpose of reserving the domain and eliminating potential 
competitors. Such a definition comes close to the one used by the ECJ to define the criteria 
for “abuse of rights”
123
. 
In its final report of the pharmaceutical sector inquiry the Commission observes that: 
“[T]he term “defensive” patents cannot be found in patent law and all patent applications need 
to be evaluated on the basis of the statutory patentability criteria, not on the basis of 
underlying intentions by the applicant. Also it is an inherent feature of a patent system to grant 
exclusive rights. The notion of “defensive patents” should therefore not be understood to 
mean that these patents are of a lower quality or value (...)”
124
 
Patent applications are generally filed with the intent to gain legal protection for an 
innovation of which the patentee plans to make commercial use on the market. The defensive 
strategy appears to be a "secondary motivation” for a patent application
125
. The key criterion 
for defining defensive patenting centres on the intent of the innovator company for filing a 
patent application but the question is how to detect a defensive intent? In practice, to detect 
the intent of a company is inherently difficult. Objective factors may however provide some 
indications of its presence
126
. Is the intent to engage in defensive strategies for instance more 
likely to exist already during the R&D phase, or at the later stage of secondary patents? The 
second option seems more plausible and could be revealed by accumulation of patents of 
little or no use at all
127
. 
 
4.  Scope for Applying Article 102 TFEU to Strategic Patenting 
Paragraph seven of the Technology Transfer Guidelines
128
 says: “Indeed, both 
bodies of law [competition law and IPR] share the same basic objective of promoting 
consumer welfare and an efficient allocation of resources..
129
 
                                                          
122  Mavroghenis, supra note 91, slide 8. 
123 In a different context, i.e. as regards rights conferred upon economic operators by Community law 
provisions, the ECJ has held that“...the scope of Community regulations must in no case be extended to 
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Community rules, the purpose of those rules has not been achieved. It requires, second, a subjective 
element consisting in the intention to obtain an advantage from the Community rules by creating artificially 
the conditions laid down for obtaining it.”; Case C-110/99 Emsland-Stärke [2000] ECR I-11569, paras 51-
53. 
124  European Commission, Final Report, supra note 89, p. 16. 
125  Ullrich, Wahrung von Wettbewerbsfreiräumen,  supra note 95. 
126 In Halifax C-255/02 [2006] ECR I-1609 para 86, the ECJ seemed to suggest that the presence of the 
subjective element can be deduced from the objective factors at hand: “...it must also be apparent from a 
number of objective factors that the essential aim of the transactions concerned is to obtain a tax 
advantage.” 
127  Ullrich, Wahrung von Wettbewerbsfreiräumen, supra note 95. 
128  See supra note 116. 
129  European Commission‟s Guidelines on the Application of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to Technology 
Transfer Agreements, [2004] C101/2. 
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Patents are granted in order to promote innovation, which is in the public interest. 
Obtaining a patent and exercising it against third parties does not turn the patentee into a 
monopolist, nor is it in principle abusive
130
 and today‟s major challenge of competition law is 
to determine at what point if at all the exercise of IP rights becomes harmful to consumer 
welfare
131
. 
In the Preliminary Report on the pharmaceutical sector inquiry the Commission 
seems to be taking a more critical view of conduct involving patenting, as it identifies a “tool 
box” of practices which in its view hamper market entry by generics and other innovators
132
. 
However, does the Commission have a case under Art. 102 TFEU? 
Conditions for applying Article 102 TFEU to refusals to licence have been established 
in the AB Volvo v. Erik Veng case
133
, as being the following: there should be no substitute for 
the product or service refused; the licence  should be indispensable to the exercise of a 
particular activity on a neighbouring market; the refusal must exclude effective competition on 
that neighbouring market where it would prevent either the appearance of a new product for 
which there is potential consumer demand or technological development to the detriment of 
consumers, and there should be no objective justification for the refusal
134
. “The conditions for 
applying Article 82 to refusals to licence can be condensed into the following: A footprint test: 
Does control of an upstream IP confer dominance on a downstream market? A consumer 
welfare balancing test: Does the refusal prevent competitors from producing value added 
products? Is an obligation to deal likely to chill investments and innovation by dominant 
firms?”
135
 
The limits of the footprint test have been expanded in IMS Health
136
, in which the ECJ 
held that the duty to supply arises only if there are separate markets, one upstream and one 
downstream
137
 and “it is sufficient that a potential market or even a hypothetical market can 
be identified”
138
.  
From an ex ante perspective, patents are a necessary incentive for the manufacturer 
to commit to R&D investments
139
. However, “[o]nce it is shown that the refusal prevents the 
marketing of a new improved/differentiated product, arguments based on ex ante incentives 
will by definition be more abstract and difficult to substantiate [and] [t]he dominant firm has the 
burden of providing evidence that the refusal is justified”
140
. The ex post test, whereby 
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131  Whish, supra note 116, pp. 758 - 759. 
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investment in innovation has been successful if it has generated valuable patents
141
 was 
developed in the Volvo
142
 case, where the ECJ stated in paragraph 8 that: “[T]he right of the 
proprietor of a protected design to prevent third parties from manufacturing and selling or 
importing, without its consent, products incorporating the design constitutes the very subject-
matter of his exclusive right . It follows that an obligation imposed upon the proprietor of a 
protected design to grant to third parties, even in return for a reasonable royalty, a licence for 
the supply of products incorporating the design would lead to the proprietor thereof being 
deprived of the substance of his exclusive right, and that a refusal to grant such a licence 
cannot in itself constitute an abuse of a dominant position.” 
This seems to support the idea that free competition should only prevail over the 
economic freedom of an IP owner, if the “refusal to grant a licence prevents the development 
of the secondary market to the detriment of consumers”
143
. However, Geradin
144
 expressed 
the concern that the impact of mandatory access on incentives to invest can be very serious, 
the real problem being the effect this will have on incentives to invest in facilities which are 
likely to be subject to compulsory sharing. Geradin believes that the use of balancing tests as 
regards ex post and ex ante efficiencies is rather problematic and their role should be limited.  
While ownership of IP rights and patenting does not automatically signify the 
existence of a dominant position and of abuse
145
, Art. 102 TFEU can be applied in 
“exceptional circumstances” in the interest of consumer welfare
146
. The question thus arising 
is whether there is actually a convincing consumer welfare case for intervening against 
strategic patenting under Art. 102 TFEU
147
. 
In the case of patent thickets, in the absence of a clear legal ground for determining 
when multiple patenting becomes illegal
148
, such an analysis has to be conducted on a case-
by-case basis, which can lead to controversy
149
. While “[i]t cannot be abusive to use the 
patent system to obtain optimal protection of an innovation”
150
, Art. 102 TFEU will be 
contravened if besides the normal patent use, an additional element would be present
151
. 
Such an additional element could for instance consist in vexatious conduct: “[V]exatious 
conduct that delays initial generic entry only for a few months may be profitable for the brand 
company and acutely harmful to consumers. (...) Rules in the European Community that allow 
brand pharmaceutical companies to initiate litigation in multiple Member States also foster an 
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enviromnent conducive to vexatious conduct. The effect of those rules is to allow brand 
phamaaceuticaI companies to re-litigate issues in a second Member State that they have 
already lost against the same generic entrant in a prior litigation in a different Member 
State.“
152
 
Secondary Patents raise similar difficulties in terms of how to argue a possible Art. 
102 TFEU case. The problem that the Commission faces is lack of competence in 
determining the value of patents in order for it to be able to override weak patents and free 
the way for generic entry
153
. Although the purpose of compulsory licensing is to foster 
innovation, it should remain a matter of patent law and not competition law
154
. 
In line with the above considerations, defensive patenting would merely appear to 
form part of normal conduct between competing companies, each trying to be the first to 
patent and thereafter to defend their positions
155
. Furthermore, according to Art. 52 of the 
EPC 2000
156
, intent of working the patent does not constitute a condition for patentability, nor 
does lack of such intent give raise to an exception of patentability according to Art. 53 EPC
157
. 
However, in its Discussion Paper on the Application of Article 82 of the Treaty to Exclusionary 
Abuses
158
, the Commission Services (DG Competition) suggest that: “[T]he refusal by a 
dominant company to license access to the IPR could be considered abusive when (...) the 
refusal to grant a licence prevents the development of the market for which the licence is an 
indispensable input, to the detriment of consumers. This may only be the case if the 
undertaking which requests the licence does not intend to limit itself essentially to duplicating 
the goods or services already offered on this market by the owner of the IPR, but intends to 
produce new goods or services not offered by the owner of the right and for which there is a 
potential consumer demand.”
159
 
In conclusion, it appears evident that competition law cannot provide an adequate 
mechanism for remedying the imperfections of the patent system.
160
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IV. Is Strategic Patenting a Response to a Legal Problem? 
 
1. Is Patent Legislation Too Permissive?  
In legal literature „evergreening‟ has frequently been labelled as an unfair and abusive 
practice which should be restrained with stricter patent legislation.
161
  
In this respect the issue of „evergreening‟ thus boils down to the question as to 
whether the existing patent legislation is capable of maintaining an adequate control over 
such practices or whether improvements are necessary? It is doubtful whether adopting new 
legislation is worth the risk
162
 of freezing innovation. As discussed in previous sections a 
strong patent protection encourages ex ante innovation and as long as an invention is 
patentable (it is new, it involves an inventive step and it is susceptible to industrial application) 
competition law ought not to intervene.
163
 
Against this background, it is nevertheless true that the practice of „evergreening‟ 
reflects a specific flaw of the system: “inventions must not solve an unsolved problem to be 
patentable and must not be efficient per se to be granted patent protection”
164
. It cannot be 
disputed that in some cases patents are granted for inventions that may contribute to 
scientific progress but do not bring about any solutions for problems that would not have 
already been resolved before
165
: “In principle this scheme allows for instance the patenting of 
different processes leading to the same result. Although not solving an unsolved problem a 
priori, these processes and methods nonetheless bring about progress. Indeed, novelty has 
no threshold to effectiveness or to progress (it just needs to be new) and industrial 
applicability does not require a „new‟ or „more efficient‟ use (there must simply be „a‟ use).”
166
 
The criterion of inventiveness needs to be assessed on the basis of the entire 
invention and not only by focusing on the individual characteristics of it
167
. Most patent 
systems employ this test to ensure that trivial changes to prior art are precluded from 
patentability
168
. In this sense, the inventiveness test was designed with the purpose of 
eliminating the possibility that patents granted for minor alterations of existing inventions 
would result in unjustifiable trade distortions
169
. 
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In this context, one suggestion made by the sector inquiry was to “raise the bar”, in 
the sense that patent offices should perform better and grant higher quality patents at a faster 
rate
170
. However laudable such a proposal might be, it still remains to be seen how it can be 
put into practice. Patent offices are increasingly over-flooded by applications, of which 
pharmaceutical patents represent only a small part, while their resources remain 
unchanged
171
. Moreover, examination of pharmaceutical patent applications must remain 
non-discriminatory and EPO should not apply standards different from those used when 
dealing with applications relating to innovations in other fields
172
. The grant of a patent by a 
patent office cannot be considered as certificate of validity, because “[i]n truth a Patent Office 
is a kind of coarse filter – rejecting clearly bad cases but having to allow those which may be 
good”
173
. 
Obviously, some companies have tried to ensure their exclusivity by taking out “weak” 
patents as part of an „evergreening‟ strategy. It should however be borne in mind that these 
practices are by no means confined to the pharmaceutical sector.
174
  
A figure of “up to 1,300” patents for one patent cluster as brought up as an example 
by the Commission
175
 might appear suspicious and hence, warrant watchful and critical 
assessment. However, regarding this particular case it should be recalled that the figure 
covers all the 27 Member States. Further, the Report does not imply that those patents are 
“weak”, and therefore the figure merely shows evidence for the grant of 1,300 patents for 
presumably perfectly good inventions.
176
 
Another suggestion made to reduce the risk of strategic patenting was to introduce an 
obligation to disclose all information known to be material to patentability by the patentee. 
However, this would entail extremely high cost for the applicant and raises questions 
regarding the actual ambit of such a proposal, such as whether the applicant would really 
need to make public internal documents and legal advice he had received prior to the patent 
claim
177
. Such disclosure could potentially compromise its position in relation to its 
competitors or in possible later legal litigation.  
Another point made in the sector inquiry concerned the involvement of third parties 
already at the patent pre-grant stage. Third parties are free to submit prior art to the office and 
make observations at the pre-grant stage but the only truly efficient measure would be a pre-
grant opposition, which was rightly rejected as the grant of patent rights would be held up for 
years
178
. Furthermore, generic companies would be unlikely to make use of such an 
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opportunity, since generally they do not oppose to the granting of a patent unless the product 
covered by it was already on the market
179
. In this context it is nevertheless a valuable 
recommendation that opposition proceedings should be dealt with faster, although the 
existing shortcomings in this respect remain more general, i.e. not specific to the 
pharmaceutical sector
180
. 
The Commission does indeed acknowledge the need for a strong and fast Central 
Patents Court for Europe
181
, which would contribute to “reducing the costs associated with 
multiple filings, by eliminating essentially parallel court cases between the same parties in 
different Member States and by enhancing legal certainty through the avoidance of conflicting 
rulings.”
182
 
Moreover, Judge Jacob is of the opinion that „evergreening‟ trough “weak” patents 
can and should be dealt with by courts. In terms of practical measures for implementing such 
recommendation he has suggested the following steps: “(a) forgetting about all changes to 
the law of grant, (b) a serious look at current opposition procedures within the EPO and (c) 
above all the creation of a respected, fast, and reliable European Patent Court.“
183
 
Intellectual property legislation should of course not confer on patent holders 
dominant positions or inflate their market power
184
. Where however that should be the case 
competition law should help to identify such situations
185
. While the exercise of IPR is not in 
itself abusive patents can be used as an instrument to gain and to abuse a dominant 
position
186
. However, in such situations it would seem that the abuse of patents amounts to a 
violation of competition rather than patent law. 
Although the pharmaceutical sector is one that is prone to stir up emotional 
responses, it is important to see beyond bad patents and realise that patents fulfil a crucial 
role to the benefit of mankind.
187
 Changes to the system should be designed and 
implemented with prudence, as any too dramatic changes could work against a significant 
part of the industry
188
. The Commission recognises the importance of patents for encouraging 
innovation and from a broader perspective, the relevance of patents to the pharmaceutical 
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industry
189
. In fact, the truth is that if the revenue sources of research companies are put in 
peril, so is future research which would be to the detriment of European citizens
190
.  
However, the fact that applications for secondary patents can be filed by the 
originator manufacturers purposefully just before the expiry  of the primary patent (or other 
exclusivity periods), is indicative of some level of distortion in the patent system as it seems to 
enable pharmaceutical companies to obtain extended patent protection whenever they might 
perceive it useful
191
. 
 
2.  Is Patent Protection Sufficient? 
As discussed and emphasised in previous sections, the risks involved in R&D 
investment and the fact that finding a patentable compound is extremely difficult, with most 
research leading nowhere and the few successful drugs having to recover all expenses
192
. It 
is therefore in principle not unreasonable to require stronger guarantees and greater rewards 
with increasing risk.
193
 
As previously stated, a patent offers a limited monopoly. Of an average of 20 years 
from the date of application, together with the supplementary protection system, patent 
holders enjoy around 10 or 11 years of exclusivity
194
. Such a relatively short period of time 
might not be sufficient to compensate for the expenses and risks involved in creating new 
drugs which therefore may in certain circumstances provide a feasible justification for 
‟evergreening‟ practices. However, regardless of how long patent protection lasts, it is unlikely 
ever to be long enough from originator businesses‟ point of view and short enough for the 
generics companies.  
In this regard it is also important to recall that the prices of medicines in Europe are 
state regulated which is why irrespective of the length of the patent exclusivity innovative 
manufacturers can never obtain the real value of their medical products, i.e. what the market 
would be willing to pay for them, but a mediated one – that is, what governments are 
prepared to pay, or what they regard as a correct price, for them. Their generic competitors 
should also be taken into account. Their situation is considerably more advantageous: little or 
no research costs, no risks assumed, not even marketing costs
195
, since the road has already 
been cleared by their predecessors – the originators. 
Traditionally, and to some extent misleadingly, generic companies have always 
emphasised  that due to their presence on the market customers can have access to 
medicines at more affordable prices, without mentioning how profitable it actually is for 
them
196
. It is not realistic to assume that generic companies favour low prices, or that their 
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values would be those of a charity. Just like their originator competitors, they are businesses 
and as such, in pursuit of profit
197
. 
Putting aside emotion and irrational prejudice
198
 against big pharmaceutical 
manufacturers one can conclude that an average of 10-11 years of exclusivity seems at first 
sight barely enough to make up for R&D costs and risks. However, it is equally important not 
to lose sight of the fact that big pharma is big business. The pharmaceutical industry is one of 
the most lucrative industries in Europe which is in line with the widely embraced economic 
theory suggesting that the higher the risk the greater the potential return on investment should 
be. However, putting it rather bluntly, if the originators‟ situation was so precarious as they at 
times imply it is, why would they continue to be interested in staying in business?   
 
Conclusion 
The Commission began its sector inquiry by investigating the economic and 
geographic dimensions of the pharmaceutical industry. It is unclear though whether it has 
actually taken due account of the fact that drug companies are after all businesses, of which 
the primary purpose is to make profits
199
. Surely the social welfare function of medicines acts 
as a catalyst for very passionate reactions towards the business practices of the 
pharmaceutical industry. The civil society feels particularly vulnerable on the topic of 
treatments for illnesses and while other business sectors also make use of the same patent 
strategies, consumers tend to feel more personally affected when those strategies are 
employed by the pharmaceutical sector. 
The first place where to look for the right approach towards „evergreening‟ and 
defensive patenting would be patent law. However, what the EPC says is only that, provided 
the conditions set out in Art. 52 et seq. are met, an invention is rightly patentable.  
Turning for assistance towards competition law, we find that the case-law on refusal 
to licence reveals the fact that competition law is not apt to deal with the imperfections of the 
patent system. From a competition law perspective, Article 102 TFEU can be applied to 
patents only in the interest of consumer welfare and only in very rare situations. Otherwise it 
would inhibit innovation and hinder competition. Therefore, it should be interesting to see the 
findings of the surprise investigations in the pharmaceutical sector launched by the 
Commission on 9 December 2009
200
 and the eventual results of the legal proceeding against 
the pharmaceutical company Lundbeck
201
. It will be very difficult to demonstrate that patent 
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strategies are abusive
202
, especially since the application of competition rules could interfere 
“with the patent regime itself and its very rationale”
203
.  
Strategic patenting will obviously remain an issue which will be subject to legal 
disputes and consideration as to at which point it becomes an abusive practice. It may 
however be regarded as an area where there are no obvious legislative (de lege ferenda) 
solutions to it apart from perhaps improvements to procedures and in view of ensuring 
consistent interpretation of law, the creation of a European Patent Court as suggested by 
judge Jacob
204
. It will also remain an issue of social dialogue between the stakeholders 
(originators, generics and consumer/customers). In this respect a general demonization of the 
pharmaceutical industry, of which the Commission may be regarded to be guilty at least in 
parts of its conclusions is not constructive. It diminishes the confidence of the pharmaceutical 
industry in the neutrality of the Commission and may damage the image of the industry. There 
is a need to strike a balance between the interests of all parties involved. 
In the area of „evergreening‟ patents should be analysed on a case‐by‐case basis. 
When interpreting the requirement of inventiveness it is crucial to consider the invention as a 
whole and not to overlook “the linkages between the inventiveness requirement and the 
novelty assessment”
205
. 
Both patents and competition law are vital for the wellbeing of consumers and the 
society at large. Patents encourage innovation and so does competition law by eliminating the 
risk of lazy patentees who want to endlessly exploit the same patents and by disallowing 
patents which could block development of further improvements to them in their respective 
domains. One question still remains open to debate: is patent law an element within the 
framework of competition rules or is rather itself the framework of innovation competition? 
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